Loading...
Symbols:
Get Seeking Alpha Free Stock Alerts by Email!
Get Free Stock Alerts by Email!
Transcripts
- Genomic Health, Inc. Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript
- Eclipsys Corporation Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript
- Innophos Holdings, Inc. Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript
- P. H. Glatfelter Company Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript
- Grubb & Ellis Company Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript
- IPG Photonics Corporation Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript
- SWS Group, Inc. F1Q09 (Qtr End 09/26/08) Earnings Call Transcript
- Winthrop Realty Trust Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript
- Kimball International, Inc. F1Q09 (Qtr End 09/30/08) Earnings Call Transcript
- Greatbatch, Inc. Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript
-
Editors' Picks
-
Most Popular
- Six Myths About the Big Three
- What's Happening to Berkshire Hathaway?
- Preferred Dividend ETFs: Shelter from the Storm?
- Berkshire Hathaway Credit Risk, Index Puts Are Overblown Worries
- TIPS Strips, Redux
- We Need ETF-Based Hedge Funds
- Full list of Editors' Picks »
- General Electric: Genuine Risk of Collapse? »
- Apple's Greatest Idea Yet »
- Four Commonsense Clues to a Genuine Market Bottom »
- GE: Not-So-Good Things Come to Light »
- The9 Q3 2008 Earnings Call Transcript »
- Thornburg Mortgage, Inc. The Wall Street Analyst Call Transcript »
- Should We Really Bail Out the Big Three Automakers with $73.20 Per Hour Labor? »
- What Are Some of the Best Hedge Fund Managers Doing? »
- Dividend Stocks: GE Affirms Current Dividend, ADP Increases 13% »
- Three Reasons for Sirius Aggravation »
- Jim Cramer's Stop Trading! Is Steve Ballmer a Diabolical Genius? (11/19/08) »
Hedge Fund Jobs
Job Seekers: Search jobs by category, get job alerts by email or live feed, apply online See full list of jobs »
Employers: See all recruitment options, get applications online or by email Post a job »
flow5
389 Comments
Why Banks Can Lend at Less Than 5%
Hocus Pocus. Inflation is the only tax.
Why Banks Can Lend at Less Than 5%
From a systems viewpoint, commercial banks as contrasted to financial intermediaries: , never loan out, and can’t loan out, existing deposits (saved or otherwise) including existing transaction deposits (TRs), or time/savings deposits (TDs) or the owner’s equity or any liability item.
When CBs grant loans to, or purchase securities from, the non-bank public (which includes every institution, the U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Government, state, and other governmental jurisdictions) & (every person, except the commercial and the Reserve Banks), they acquire title to earning assets by initially, the creation of an equal volume of new money- (TRs) -- somewhere in the banking system.
The lending capacity of the member CBs of the Federal Reserve System is limited by the volume of free/gratis legal (excess) reserves put at their disposal by the Federal Reserve Banks in conjunction with the reserve ratios applicable to their deposit liabilities (10% on transaction accounts in excess of the low-reserve tranche), as fixed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, etc., etc.
Thus, it's not possible to compare the non-banks to the commercial banks when talking about "funding" or the supply of loan-funds. The commercial banks (as a system of banks) pay for something that they already have (interest bearing deposits). The (CBs & intermediaries) modus operandi is diametrically opposed.
The member CBs could continue to lend if the public ceased to save altogether.
Are We Targeting the Wrong Monetary Aggregates?
(1) does not confuse the supply of money with the supply of loan-funds;
(2) can make the proper distinctions between means-of-payment money and liquid assets;
(3) knows the difference between money creating institutions and financial intermediaries;
(4) recognizes aggregate monetary demand is measured by the flow of monmey not nominal GDP;
(5) recognizes that interest rates are the price of loan-funds, not the price of money;
(6) loan-funds are equal to the volume of money in only one incremental sense - when commercial banks make loans to or acquire securites from the non-bank public.
(7) recognizes that the price of money is represented by the price level (price indices); &
(8) realizes that inflation is the most important factor determining interest rates, operating as it does through both the demand for and the supply of loan-funds;
(9) and above all else, recognize that even a temporary pegging of a series of federal funds rates over time, forces the FED to abdicate its power to regulate properly the money supply.
LIBOR Shows Worst Is Yet to Come for Credit Markets
Greenspan Is to Blame for Today's Problems
Milton Friedman lacks a great deal of knowledge about money & central banking. I don't consider him a monetarist.
Monetary policy objectives should not be in terms of any particular rate or range of growth of any monetary aggregate. Rather, policy should be formulated in terms of desired roc’s in monetary flows (MVt) relative to roc’s in real GDP. Note: roc’s in nominal GDP can serve as a proxy figure for roc’s in all transactions. Roc’s in real GDP have to be used, of course, as a policy standard.
Bubbles are impossible to miss as is any signifant change in GDP.
Crocodile Tears and the LIBOR-OIS Spread
How Bad Is the Fed's Balance Sheet?
The source of alarm and confusion is that there’s no unique price effect of federal outlays as compared to state and local government outlays, or expenditures by the private sector. The shifting of funds to and out of the Federal Reserve has a dollar for dollar effect on member bank reserves, but that problem is dealt with through open market operations. Whenever excessive reserves are pumped into the System because of "support" operations, the Manager of the Open Market Account sterilizes the System’s legal reserves, after the need for the support operation has passed.
I believe that there is another example? that during WWI,I the member banks could have converted their IBDDs into the entire amount of Federal Reserve bank notes (National Currency $660 mill) without the necessity of any expansion of Reserve Bank Credit.
It's the Capital, Not Liquidity, Stupid
Relax Basel II's Bank Capital Adequacy Requirements
The liquidity and solvency of the banks should be based credit worthiness of the loan or investment and not the adequacy of bank capital. Contrary to Sheila C. Bair, chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, this is the most important determination of the banks soundness.
Relax Basel II's Bank Capital Adequacy Requirements
Bailout Backfire and the Ticking Debt Time Bomb
THE MONEY SUPPLY CAN NEVER BE MANAGED BY ANY ATTEMPT TO CONTROL THE COST OF CREDIT.
Bailout Backfire and the Ticking Debt Time Bomb
For example if the debt was acquired to finance the acquisition of a (new-security), the proceeds of which are used to finance plant and equipment expansion, rather than the purchase of an (existing-security) to finance the construction of a new house, rather than to finance the purchase of an existing one (as will Paulson's planned $700 bill bailout), or to finance (inventory-expansion), rather than refinance (existing-inventories)...
The former types of investment are designated as "real" as contrasted to the latter, which constitute "financial" investment (existing homes). Financial investment provides a relatively insignificant demand for labor and materials and in some instances the over-all effects may actually be retarding to the economy. Compared to real investment,it is rather inconsequential as a contributor to employment and production. Only debt growing out of real investment or consumption makes an actual direct demand for labor and materials.
Bailout Backfire and the Ticking Debt Time Bomb
Bailout Backfire and the Ticking Debt Time Bomb
Unprecedentedly large deficits “absorb” a disproportinoately large share of nominal GDP
Present deficits are unprecedented no matter how measured, and the past gives us no reliable guide to the future effects of deficit financing, beneficial or otherwise.
To appraise the effect of the federal budget deficit on interest rates, it is necessary to compare the deficit, not to GDP, but to the volume of CURRENT SAVINGS made available to the credit markets. The current deficit is absorbing about 24% of gross savings.
The more alarming aspect of the deficits is not the effect on interest rates but the effect of high interest rates on the level of taxable income and the volume of taxes required to serve a cumulative debt now exceeding $10+ trillion. Both high interest rates and high taxes induce stagflation, thus eroding the tax base and increasing the volume of futures deficits.
Bailout Backfire and the Ticking Debt Time Bomb
Any given deficit should be evaluated in terms of: (1) the size of the deficit in the context of the size of future deficits, and the accumulated debt relative to the means and costs of financing the whole: (2) how the deficit is financed: (a) from savings or (b) commercial bank credit, i.e., newly created money; and (3) the purpose for which the deficits are incurred.
Prorating the federal deficits over the entire spectrum of federal expenditures, it can be said that virtually all of the current deficits are attributable to defense spending, military and civil service pensions, interest on the debt, and welfare and unemployment benefits. Social security for now is not include in the above list since only a very small proportion of social security benefits are financed from non-social security taxes. From an economic standpoint, only interest is “untouchable”.
If current projections of Federal Deficits materialize in this, and the next few years, interest rates (both long and short-term) will be driven up sharply by the increased demand for loan funds. I.e., any recovery in the economy will present a “Catch 22” situation. An upturn in the economy will add increased private demand for loan funds to the insatiable demands of the Federal Government. The consequent rise in interest rates will effectively abort any recovery.
Raising taxes to accomplish a reduction in the deficit would be counter-productive. Most of this debt is short-term. Combine this with the factor with the constant roll-over of some of the long-term debt and it becomes obvious that the burden of higher interest rates will be compounded.
The burden becomes a function of the major portion of the debt, not just the current deficits. The burden, in fact, becomes exponential. In other words, if the trend is not stopped, the debt inevitably has to be repudiated.